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Government information system failures are filling not only newspapers 
but also parliamentary and administrative reports. This article deals with a 
case in which information and communication technologies (ICT)–related 
failure claimed by the media influenced the parliamentary agenda, and 
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parliamentary commission’s hearings, it argues that the way the issue 
was initially framed by the media and then adopted, un-problematized, by 
Parliament steered the direction of action toward specific administrative 
solutions, thus shaping the landscape of possible organizational alliances. 
The article recommends a proactive role of parliaments in framing 
ICT projects.
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Digital government faces a paradox. On one hand, e-government programs 
still conceive of the informatization of administrative procedures as a driver 
for rationalization, innovation, and economic growth. On the other hand, fail-
ure rates in public administration’s digital infrastructure development repre-
sent examples of irrational investments in the eyes of both the media and 
citizens.
Traditionally, e-government studies and practitioners have tended to see in 
information and communication technologies (ICT) the embodiment of 
Weber’s promises of bureaucracy as an organizational form rooted in standard-
ized legal-rational authority (Weber, 1980). “In the second half of the 20th cen-
tury information technologies have been regarded much as Weber’s conception 
of bureaucracy was regarded in the first half—that is, a rationalising force in 
government” (Margetts, 2003, p. 4). For this reason, e-government has been 
associated with “modernisation,” “efficiency improvement,” “procedural 
streamlining,” and “simplification” as forms of rational standardization.
However, public and media debates increasingly depict the informatiza-
tion of the public sector as a never-ending, complex, expensive, and uncertain 
process, and ICT1 expenditures are often seen as an unjustified “waste” of 
public money. With the recent economic crisis shrinking resources for public 
services such as healthcare and education, the invisibility of information 
infrastructure (Aurigi, 2008; DeNardis, 2012) has become a hindrance in jus-
tifying increasing expenditure on ICT. Therefore, criticisms of the gap 
between high investment and the (claimed) lack of benefits have flourished 
on expert blogs (Ballard, 2013; Bloch, Blumberg, & Laartz, 2012; Veldwijk, 
2013), as well as in the more traditional media (Bos, 2014; Stokmans, 2014a; 
Tromp, 2013).
How has it happened that technologies that promised so much came to be 
framed in such a dystopian way?
Failures are a long-standing concern in the information system literature 
(Jiang & Klein, 1999; Lyytinen & Hirschheim, 1987; Sauer, 1997). However, 
whereas in the private sector ICT failures are usually regarded as unavoidable 
by-products of innovation, when it comes to taxpayer-funded projects, fail-
ures are often accompanied by public criticism and high visibility in the 
media. In some cases, debates can migrate into the political domain, be the 
subject of parliamentary debate, and even trigger consequences in the organi-
zation of the administration.
The case of the London Ambulance Service (LAS) is a well-known exam-
ple in this regard (Beynon-Davies, 1995, 1999; Finkelstein & Dowell, 1996). 
In 1992, the newly developed LAS Computer-Aided Dispatch system 
(LASCAD) failed, leading newspapers to report that between 20 and 30 
patients probably died as a direct consequence of the breakdown (Watts & 
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MacKinnon, 1992). Following this claim, not only was a parliamentary pub-
lic inquiry launched, but also the chief executive was forced to resign 
(MacKinnon & Goodwin, 1992).
More recently, in the United Kingdom the Child Support Agency system, 
the Passport Agency system, the tax credit system, the Rural Payments 
Agency system (Syal, 2013), and the National Health Survey (NHS) patient 
record system (Curtis, 2011; Syal, 2013) have made newspapers headlines 
and professional blogs (Ballard, 2013) as examples of major failures. These 
and other cases were investigated not only by the National Audit Office but 
also by parliamentary commissions, such as the Public Administration Select 
Committee (PASC; 2011).
The Netherlands is another country in which several parliamentary working 
groups and commissions have been set up to address claims of failure origi-
nally reported by the media. This country shows interesting peculiarites. First, 
ICT failures have been dealt with by many political initiatives, some of which 
were launched ad hoc. Unlike in the United Kingdom (where the PASC is a 
permanent parliamentary committee that conducts inquiries about a broad 
range of problems, not only failures nor information systems), in the Netherlands 
temporary commissions and working groups were established with the specific 
purpose of addressing ICT failures. Second, it may happen that media-triggered 
claims do not stop at the political discursive level, but come to affect the orga-
nization of administrative inter-departmental relations.
This was demonstrated in the workings of a recent (2012-2014) Dutch 
temporary parliamentary commission on failures in governmental ICT pro-
grams. This commission was established to investigate claims of huge “wast-
ing” of public money as initially reported by newspapers. Newspapers 
identified failures as a government-wide problem and attributed those to 
technical causes alone. By adopting this formulation without further prob-
lematization, the Parliament de facto reinforced and legitimated it. This 
seamless adoption eventually turned out to have consequences not only for 
the political debate on ICT failures but also for the operational organization 
of inter-departmental relations.
Using this case as evidence, this article on one hand attempts to extend the 
concept of framing as a model of the relationship between government and 
the media to the field of government infrastructural failures. While agenda 
setting and other approaches that are specifically focused on infrastructural 
failures stress the role of media in putting a specific issue under the spotlight 
of the political agenda, other scholarly perspectives also highlight the impor-
tance of how such issues are constructed. The cascading activation model, for 
instance, assumes that interpretive frames “leak” from the higher level of 
government down to parliamentary and expert elites, then to the media and 
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their frames and—finally—trickle down to public opinion (Entman, 2004). 
However, when their content resonates with “cultural congruence,” specific 
frames can become influential enough to feed back from the lower to the 
higher levels (Entman, 2003).
We suggest that the discussion on which one (media or politics) exerts more 
influence over the other can turn out to be not so much a binary argument (i.e., 
does politics influence media or vice versa), but rather a function of the alliances 
facilitated or hampered in a specific time period by a specific frame. Analyzing 
the success of a specific frame as a function of its content, this article shows how 
situated representations of actors and causes can trigger path dependencies that 
shape the landscape of possible alliances and inevitable deadlocks.
On the other hand, this inextricability of content and context does not only 
affect the political debate on ICT failures. Once the Parliament adopts a specific 
frame as dominant, this latter can acquire some power to enforce changes in the 
operational organization of inter-governmental relations. Whereas literature has 
amply addressed the relationship between media debates and policy processes 
(Kingdon, 1995; Rochefort & Cobb, 1994), the extent to which the inner work-
ings of the administrative organization are affected by public debates is an 
under-investigated field of inquiry, to which this article attempts to contribute.
The following section presents the main theoretical frames on media and 
government on which this work is built. In particular, it compares phronetic 
planning research and cascading activation as far as the direction of influence 
and attitude toward frame content are concerned. In Section Method, method-
ological choices are accounted for, as far as both data collection and data 
analysis are concerned. In that section, we also briefly introduce a specific 
understanding of failures as unstabilized assemblages, drawn from the 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) research field that underpins this 
research. In Section Results, a case study is described narratively, resulting 
from the comparative analysis of some hearings held before the Dutch parlia-
mentary commission on ICT. That case shows how the media’s framing of 
governmental ICT policies as “waste of public money” has triggered political 
support and, eventually, led to organizational transformations in government 
procedures, actors, and tasks. In Section Discussion, we further develop the 
results of the narrative analysis, and finally we draw some conclusions.
Literature on Media, Government, and 
Infrastructural Failures
In an article recently appearing in this journal, Klijn, van Twist, van der Steen, 
and Jeffares (2014) identified three perspectives on the media’s influence on 
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government: public relations, mediatization, and agenda setting. For the pur-
poses of this research, only the second and third of these are considered.
The conceptual framework on mediatization concentrates on the intrinsic 
characteristics of the media system, and identifies some biases—termed 
“media logics”—that can strongly influence political or administrative ratio-
nales. According to Bennett (2009), four types of informational biases can be 
identified as a result of recent economic developments in the media business: 
(a) strong personalization of events, (b) emphasis on conflict and crisis, (c) 
focus on isolated stories out of context, and (d) preoccupation with social 
order. “Media logics” can invade other domains, such as the political and 
administrative ones, forcing them to adapt to their inherent requirements 
(Altheide & Snow, 1979; Strömbäck, 2011). This “invasion” mainly takes the 
form of politicians and public executives adapting to the media logic by 
“speaking in sound bites and dramatizing their performance” (Klijn et al., 
2014, p. 9).
The agenda-setting perspective is explicitly focused on how the media can 
influence the political agenda. “The agenda perspective highlights the com-
plexity of the interaction between media and governance processes and the 
various factors that might influence the impact of media attention on [politi-
cal] agenda setting” (Klijn et al., 2014, p. 8). Authors in this tradition con-
sider the role that the media play in placing a specific problem under the 
spotlight. Some of them focus in particular on how a policy issue comes to be 
constructed as a result of struggles among actors that compete to set the polit-
ical agenda (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Kingdon, 1995; Rochefort & Cobb, 
1994).
Drawing on both perspectives, Flyvbjerg (2012) describes how planning 
research on megaproject2 failures was able to generate media exposure and 
top positions in the public agenda, thus in turn effectively gaining political 
impact in transforming planning practices. The “phronetic planning research” 
Flyvbjerg and his colleagues pursue consists of “injecting” research results 
into the media coverage of megaprojects. According to the author, this form 
of publication triggers some “tension points”3 that make the story relevant for 
the media, and are thus likely to enter the political agenda. With their focus 
on power and “suspicious practices,” tension points are in fact potentially 
generative of story-telling that is interesting for the media. Therefore, alli-
ances become possible between planning researchers providing studies on 
cost overruns, benefit shortfalls, risk, optimism, and deception, and media 
hungry for narratives of conflict and crisis.
When, for instance, phronetic researchers released results about the first 
Danish megaproject,4 the threats received by a high-ranking government 
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revealed that a tension point had been reached. Not only did phronetic strat-
egy gain media attention, but the issue moved to a high position in the public 
agenda, and ultimately, it led members of the Danish Parliament to address 
the media debate in Parliament (Flyvbjerg, 2012).
Phronetic planning researchers look for tension points to question existing 
planning practices, and thereby create space for new, more democratic, effec-
tive, and transparent procedures (Flyvbjerg, Landman, & Schram, 2012). 
However, the notion of “tension point” itself reveals little of its content. 
Following the mediatization perspective mentioned above, emphasis is put 
on controversy, conflict, and crisis as vectors to achieve media attention, 
regardless of the situated meanings being conveyed.
At the other end of the spectrum, the cascading activation model accounts for 
the influence of government on the media by focusing on the frames that circu-
late at the various levels of society (Entman, 2003, 2004). This model was devel-
oped to explain parliamentary and lobbying elites’ influence on U.S. foreign 
policy; however, it can also provide valuable insights for our field of analysis.
The cascading activation model assumes framing as the process of “selecting 
and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among 
them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution” 
(Entman, 2004, p. 5). The model proposes a five-tier metaphorical cascade in 
which frames and influence spread from one actor on the top of the network to 
the others (Figure 1). Actors are (a) government administration, (b) parliamen-
tary and expert elites, (c) media and (d) their frames, and (e) civil society.
According to Entman, the spread of “ideas” is highly stratified. As with 
actual waterfalls, while moving downward is relatively straightforward, for 
ideas to move upward, an additional “pumping mechanism” is required. 
Looking at Figure 1, it can be deduced that while influence proceeding from 
the executive branch level exerts the greatest strength, it is much more diffi-
cult for frames at lower levels to move back up to leaders. For example, 
“journalists possess less ability to shape news frames than members of the 
administration or elite networks” (Entman, 2003, p. 422).
However, despite this hierarchical conceptualization, Entman identifies a 
“pumping mechanism” that can enforce frames generated at the lower levels. 
What he terms “cultural congruence” measures the ease with which a frame 
can cascade or rise up through the different levels. Drawing on the hegemony 
theory (Augelli & Murphy, 1988), he argues that
the more congruent the frame with schemas that dominate the political culture, 
the more success it will enjoy . . . . The most inherently powerful frames are 
those fully congruent with schemas habitually used by most members of 
society. Such frames have the greatest intrinsic capacity to arouse similar 
responses. (Entman, 2003, p. 422, emphasis in original)
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In summary, while—drawing on agenda-setting theories—approaches 
native to the field of planning and infrastructural failures highlight the power 
of phronetic researchers to influence the media and politics by harnessing con-
flict and opposition, frame-based approaches native to foreign policy scholar-
ship assume a more hierarchical model of influence, nevertheless mitigated by 
“cultural congruence.” In the remainder of this article, we address a case simi-
lar to that depicted by phronetic planning researchers, in which mass media 
debates on failures in infrastructure developments turned out to be successful 
in influencing the parliamentary agenda. However, we show not just that the 
conduct of the media had consequences for the political agenda, but also that 
the way in which the issue at stake was framed by the media steered the direc-
tion of action toward specific organizational solutions. In other words, the 
case analyzed suggests that the discussion about which one (media or politics) 
Figure 1. Cascading network activation.
Source. Entman (2003, 2004).
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exerts more influence over the other can reveal unexpected situatedness, if 
only one takes into consideration how an issue is constructed. In a given situ-
ation, specific representations of actors and causes can trigger path dependen-
cies that shape the landscape of possible alliances and inevitable deadlocks. 
Before that, we briefly describe the methodology used in this study.
Method
To obtain data, we analyzed the hearings of the Dutch temporary parliamentary 
commission on governmental ICT projects. Ministerial decrees, newspaper 
articles, and expert blog posts were also analyzed, to cross-check the actors’ 
accounts. The selection of the newspaper articles and blog posts was not con-
ducted on a statistically valid sample. Rather, newspaper articles and expert 
blog post were analyzed that had been explicitly acknowledged as relevant by 
informants themselves during the parliamentary hearings. This choice followed 
a constructivist approach that does not assume a priori some sources as more 
relevant than others, but does consider the citations made by informants as 
relevant in themselves (Latour, 2005).5 The parliamentary commission on ICT 
was established in 2012 as one of the eight research commissions required by 
the “Future and Research Agenda 2012” approved by the Lower House of the 
Dutch Parliament in late 2011. The ICT commission was expected to report on 
the causes of the alleged high failure rates in informatization projects in the 
public sector. In particular, it was tasked with finding out why significant 
investments had returned considerably fewer benefits than promised. To this 
end, the commission was tasked with assessing ongoing projects and recom-
mending methods to standardize project management.6 In April 2014, the first 
hearings took place, and the final report was published in October 2014.
The commission’s hearings provided rich opportunities for analysis in 
three respects. First, being a parliamentary initiative, the commission translated 
into the political agenda some debates that up to that moment had taken place 
in traditional media or Internet blogs. The commission was a sense-making 
endeavor, which—by directly and explicitly addressing Dutch citizens7— 
contributed to the stabilization of criticism as a structuring dynamic of the 
national politics of informatization.
Second, the hearings allowed the comparison of accounts given by a wide 
range of actors (ministries, local authorities, civil servants and public managers, 
consultants, executives from supplying companies, and small entrepreneurs), 
some of whom would have been difficult to reach for a research interview 
(e.g., ministries). Third, because during the hearings informants were explic-
itly asked to provide their explanations of why projects failed, their accounts 
described in unexpected detail the inner workings of government.
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As to the methods for data analysis, in the wide range of approaches to nar-
rative policy analysis (Van Eeten, 2007), we chose narratology, which privi-
leges the close reading of the specifics of texts (Bal, 1998). First, we identified 
the narratives present in the accounts by individual informants. Here, the unit 
of analysis was single hearing sessions (about 1.5 hr), during which members 
of the ICT commission posed questions to individual informants. As for the 
purposes of this article we concentrated on high-level decision makers (e.g., 
ministries, public executives), there was no need to reconstruct collective nar-
ratives that were representative of diverse types of actors (Van Eeten, 2007).
Second, for each narrative identified, we recognized pairs of opposing 
actors. In particular, we looked at how tasks and roles were distributed among 
actors, according to the competences and types of knowledge they were said 
to have. Third, we looked at whether other actors mediating the frictions 
between the opponents were recognizable. This additional step was crucial, 
as it assumed that infrastructural failures were unstable assemblages that 
needed to enroll further actors to achieve stabilization.
This is a major methodological suggestion drawn from that branch of Science 
and Technology Studies termed “Actor-Network Theory” (ANT). ANT explains 
the relationship between elements (i.e., actors, both human and non-human) and 
the whole assemblage (i.e., networks) in terms of “translation.” Translation 
refers not only to the transformation of meaning from one language to another 
but also to the position an actor comes to occupy in a network as a result of the 
alignment of its and others’ interests (Latour, 1987, p. 117).
ANT therefore explains failures in terms of actor-networks that are not yet 
stabilized and that need to enroll new potential actors (both humans and tech-
nologies) through a chain of translations that iteratively defines and positions 
them in the network. As the number of actors enrolled increases, the network 
is both lengthened and strengthened, to the point at which it becomes stable. 
If failing infrastructures need to enroll additional actors to achieve stabiliza-
tion, by tracing those actors that mediated frictions, we thus hoped to dis-
cover which new actors were enrolled in Dutch governmental ICT projects to 
prevent failures. Table 1 summarizes these three analytical steps.
Results
“Failing Governmental ICT Projects” in the Media: Government-
Wide and Technical
Government ICT infrastructural failures entered the Dutch public agenda as 
a fully fledged issue only in 2007. According to the hearings, until 2007, 
there was no comprehensive monitoring of ICT projects operating at the 
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governmental level. ICT activities were dispersed around the directorates in 
charge of personnel, organization, and information at the various government 
departments. Most importantly, informatization used to be the responsibility 
of each individual ministry.
Things changed in early June 2007, when an article titled “Automation 
Swallows Billions of Euros” appeared in the Trouw newspaper (Dekker, 
2007). Drawing on international comparative research, the article claimed 
that more than 6 billion euros per year were being “wasted” in “automation 
systems” by “the government.” The article reported calculations by profes-
sors from the universities of Eindhoven and Amsterdam that showed that of 
all ICT projects, 30% were never completed, 50% encountered serious prob-
lems, and only 20% could be termed successful.
These claims drove the Lower House of the Parliament into investigating 
“why so many ICT projects were running out of hand,” as the chairman of the 
2012 to 2014 commission put it. On June 13, 2007, the first debate took place 
in the Lower House, chaired by an ad hoc working group. Over the years, 
several audit initiatives followed up.
Like in the accounts by phronetic planning researchers, in the Dutch case, 
the alliance between researchers and mass media reporting on failures in 
infrastructural developments succeeded in influencing the parliamentary 
agenda, such that ad hoc working groups and commissions were established, 
rather than the other way round, as Entman’s model would suggest. Even 
Table 1. Steps for Data Analysis.
Steps Unit of analyses Example
1. Frame identification Single hearing sessions 
involving ministries, senior 
government officers, 
contractor executives, 
civil servants
ICT failures as 
government-wide issue
2.  Identification of 
actor/task patterns
Single frame Cabinet is responsible for 
project implementation, 
Parliament must control
3.  Identification of 
mediators
Actor/task patterns RICTC as responsible 
for ICT coordination 
between departments, it 
also mediates between 
Cabinet and Parliament
Note. ICT = information and communication technologies; RICTC = responsible for ICT 
coordination.
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more, the effects of the media debate were not limited to the political agenda. 
As the 2014 commission’s hearings revealed,8 the Trouw article activated a 
series of upward cascades that had also consequences for inter-departmental 
relations. However, these consequences were not simply triggered by the dif-
fusion of the issue to other media—other newspapers and expert blogs in 
primis—and political elites, as Flyvbjerg’s approach would suggest. The way 
the issue was originally constructed had a major role in making some alli-
ances more likely, while hampering others. The way in which the “failing 
ICT projects” issue was framed by the Trouw article rested on two premises:
1. Failures in information infrastructure are a government-wide problem 
and, therefore, should be addressed in a centralized way.
2. Failures in information infrastructures primarily have technical 
causes and, therefore, require technical knowledge.
First, in defining the issue, the Trouw article referred to “all ICT projects” 
“in the government” (bij de overheid).9 That is, ICT infrastructural failures 
were framed as a single government-wide phenomenon. The article did not 
refer to discrete informatization activities scattered around the various depart-
ments, ministries, or at other governmental levels (e.g., municipalities), but 
to what could be termed a “partitive totality” (Greimas, 1976): an ensemble 
of distinct entities that can nonetheless only be conceived in an aggregate 
manner—namely, “governmental ICT projects.”
Second, the Trouw article framed “governmental ICT projects” as primar-
ily technical activities aimed at automating existing administrative processes 
(automatiseringssystemen). By definition, automation refers to the streamlin-
ing of existing procedures through the use of machines, with the aim of 
reducing human intervention. This dichotomous approach was reinforced by 
the article, which identified failures as technical in nature (e.g., software 
bugs; Dekker, 2007). The article might have mentioned, but it did not, differ-
ent causes, such as the non-use of perfectly running software, as the scholar-
ship on technology and users has shown (Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2003; Wyatt, 
2003).
Given this specific framing, it is important to note that not only had the 
newspaper used a very narrow frame, but also Parliament immediately closed 
it off. No counter-frame was offered by the parliamentary bodies to construct 
an alternative narrative. On one hand, “ICT projects in government” was the 
standard definition by which parliamentary initiatives had been labeled since 
2007. In particular, the 2012 to 2014 parliamentary commission framed 
information infrastructures as a partitive totality to be addressed Cabinet-
wide, rather than at the level of individual departments. As we will see in the 
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next sub-section, this framing enabled the Lower House to demand an over-
view of all governmental informatization activities, thus engaging in direct 
confrontation with the Cabinet. This in fact pre-selected and sharply reduced 
the range of options available to prevent future failures.
On the other hand, the parliamentary commission embraced Trouw’s under-
standing of ICT projects as primarily technical endeavors requiring exclusively 
technical knowledge (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2013). During the commission 
hearings, only one civil servant resisted an instrumental understanding of infor-
mation infrastructure development as something separate from the primary 
processes of policy making: “there are no such things as governmental ICT 
projects, but only projects led by the government” (a public officer).
In summary, by seamlessly adopting the Trouw frame without further 
problematization (Callon, 1986), parliamentary working groups and commis-
sions de facto reinforced and legitimated it. Far from being an unquestionable 
objective fact, the “failing governmental ICT projects” issue was the result of 
researchers and a newspaper framing information infrastructure development 
as a primarily technical activity taking place government-wide, and of politi-
cal actors (i.e., parliamentary working groups and commissions) adopting 
this definition without problematizing it. In Entman’s terms, we have here a 
case of “total dominance” by one frame initiated by the alliance between 
researchers and a leading newspaper, and reinforced by parliament. As we 
will show in the following sub-sections, this seamless adoption had conse-
quences for the administrative response to failure claims.
Introducing a New Role: The Responsible for ICT Coordination 
(RICTC)
We might say that the Trouw article performed three of the four basic func-
tions that the cascading activation model attributes to frames: (a) It defined a 
condition as problematic, (b) it identified its causes, and (c) it conveyed a 
moral judgment of those involved (Entman, 2004, p. 5). The fourth func-
tion—that is, endorsing remedies to the problem—was left to the parliamen-
tary bodies.
The primary measure proposed by Parliament to stabilize governmental 
ICT project costs and time overruns was a new control function. A “respon-
sible for ICT coordination” (RICTC) role was meant to exert control, and to 
provide the Parliament with a constant overview of ICT projects being devel-
oped by all central government departments.
As Figure 2 shows schematically, the way this new role was envisaged by 
Parliament was consistent with the way the issue was initially constructed by 
the Trouw article:
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1. The RICTC role was expected to report from a government-wide 
perspective.
2. The RICTC role was expected to report on all projects having some 
information technology component.
First, the RICTC role was intended to have a government-wide insight. 
This was not the only possible level of analysis, as individual ministries 
would also have been in a position to report individually to Parliament. 
However, the level selected entailed establishing a single coordinating role 
with the duty of reporting to Parliament about all ICT activities initiated by 
the Cabinet. This solution was consistent with the construction of the issue of 
“failing governmental ICT projects” as a partitive totality.
Second, the RICTC role was intended to report on all projects that had any 
information technology component. As the previously mentioned civil servant 
noted, what fitted into this category was not unambiguous. Far from being onto-
logically grounded, the distinction between technical and non-technical projects 
Figure 2. Consistency between the RICTC role and initial issue framing.
Note. RICTC = responsible for ICT coordination; ICT = information and communication 
technologies.
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was consistent with Trouw originally framing the issue as technical, and with 
Parliament accepting that characterization unquestioningly.
The new coordinating role was therefore established as endowed with pur-
posefully centralizing functions. The RICTC was meant to achieve a com-
plete overview of all ICT projects of the whole Cabinet, and to be the main 
source of information for Parliament. Unsurprisingly, deciding which actor 
should actually assume the RICTC role was not straightforward.
The solution initially envisaged by the Parliament was to delegate the 
RICTC role to one ministry. However, this solution collided with both consti-
tutional and unwritten bureaupolitical logics. On one hand, in the Dutch con-
stitutional system, ministers have overall responsibility for their departments, 
which are constitutionally independent of each other (Andeweg & Irwin, 
2005). Granting coordinating responsibility over ICT to one ministry would 
have meant subordinating other ministries’ autonomy to a primus-inter-pares 
(i.e., first among equals). For this reason, members of the Cabinet resisted the 
idea of delegating the new role to one member:
The Lower House actually wanted the Minister for Internal Affairs to take 
overall responsibility for all ICT projects. At the request of the Chamber, I 
dutifully explained this to the Cabinet. The cabinet members—by the way, 
together with me—did not find that a good idea. I have already mentioned the 
reason for that: you should not have just one person, if at all possible, 
responsible for all government ICT projects . . . . If you make just one minister 
responsible, then you have to change the Constitution. (Former Minister of 
Internal Affairs)
On the other hand, this resistance also revealed the collegial attitude proper 
to the Dutch Cabinet, where bureaupolitical logic prevents one minister from 
imposing her or his will on other members of the Cabinet. As one member of 
the temporary commission summed it up, “it might be not so much the juridi-
cal arguments that are prohibitive, but the more political and administrative 
arguments that may be the real obstacle” (a commission member).
Informatization and the Centralization of Operational 
Management
Summarizing previous arguments, the media first—and in their wake politi-
cians—framed the issue of “failures in governmental ICT projects” in such a 
way that the main role introduced to stabilize the actor-network (i.e., the 
RICTC) deliberately entailed centralized control. Indeed, the RICTC role 
was expected to achieve a panopticon-like overview of all government-wide 
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technical activities, and to act as a mediator between Parliament and the 
Cabinet. Because of this nodality, it turned out to be difficult to delegate this 
role to an actual actor; constitutional and bureaupolitical considerations pre-
vented it from being attributed to a single ministry.
Other logics not directly related to informatization came to drive the 
conundrum out of the deadlock. Between 2007 and 2010, a centralization of 
operational management (bedrijsfvoering) was taking place at the Dutch gov-
ernment. This resulted in one ministry assuming a Cabinet-wide coordinating 
role for operational tasks. As the RICTC role was framed as technical and 
Cabinet-wide, the solution of the conundrum was found in this ongoing cen-
tralization trend, and solutions analogous to those created for other opera-
tional tasks were found.
Here follows a description of how this happened, in reverse chronological 
order. In a 2010 letter to the Lower House of Parliament, the Minister for 
Internal Affairs requested that her Ministry be given the coordinating role in 
all modes of operational management for the whole Cabinet. The Minister’s 
request was motivated by budget-cutting imperatives:
[Establishing a coordinating ministry for operational management] was not just 
about ICT, but also about the operational management of central Government. 
The main driver to appoint a coordinating minister was the established objective 
of reducing the size of the civil service by 10,000 employees . . . . Members of 
the Cabinet had to do this jointly. Then, you have to agree on how to achieve 
such a cut, what you cut, how many officers remain at which departments, and 
so on. Certainly at that point there was a need for coordination. (Former 
Minister of Internal Affairs)
In the words of the former Dutch Minister of Internal Affairs, the “policy 
making versus operational management” dichotomy10 was invoked to over-
come deadlocks in inter-departmental relations when it came to substantial 
restructuring of the civil service. While—as we have seen above—policy 
making was constitutionally the preserve of individual ministries, operational 
management could follow a different path. As a consequence, technical oper-
ations (including personnel management) could be centralized under the 
responsibility of one ministry, provided that they were not delegated to politi-
cal bodies (i.e., the minister), but to technical ones (i.e., a new Directorate 
General; see below).
Indeed, throughout the period from 2007 to 2010 centralization of opera-
tional management across inter-departmental relations was a novelty for the 
Netherlands, as a brief historical reconstruction can demonstrate.11 In the Dutch 
ministerial system, until 2006 operational management tasks were carried on 
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by autonomous units in each ministry.12 However, in 2007 operational man-
agement started to follow a movement toward centralization that culminated 
in the 2010 letter to the Lower House of the Parliament referred to above. As 
early as 2007, operational management had transformed into something more 
than a set of tasks replicated within each ministry. A few months after coming 
into office, the Minister of Internal Affairs established a new Directorate 
General for Central Organization and Operational Management (DG COOM) 
in her Ministry. The tasks of the new DG included “the development, imple-
mentation, maintenance and evaluation of a Government-wide common 
vision of operational management, and contributing to the preparation of pro-
posals for further cooperation and integration in that area” (Minister van 
Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2007, authors’ emphasis).
The strengthening of a coordinating role for operational management at 
the central Cabinet level was further enforced by the ministerial decree of 
July 4, 2008, titled “Central Government Reform.”
The Cabinet sets new government-wide goals for operational management. 
The Cabinet considers it necessary for operational management that a 
framework policy at the central level shall be enacted. This should cover the 
field of Human Resource Management, Information Management and 
Information- and Communication-Technology [emphasis added], Procurement, 
Housing and Facilities Management. Therefore, I have established the 
Directorate General Central Organisation and Operational Management (DG 
COMM) at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Council of Ministers has 
agreed to the terms of reference of this DG COOM. In line with this, the 
administrative units across the operational management of the civil service will 
also be reorganized as to their tasks, responsibilities and mandates. (Minister 
van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2008)
The change in inter-governmental relations entailed a reorganization of 
tasks and responsibilities across administrative units. The Directorate 
Personnel, Organization and Information, for instance, was composed of a 
Director Staff, an Employment Department, a Labour Quality Department, 
an Organization Department, and an Information Department. The 2007’s 
ministerial decree re-allocated these departments to the newly constituted 
DG COOM.
As a result of the ongoing enforcement of a Cabinet-wide coordination for 
operational management, the role of RICTC followed a destiny similar to that 
of the coordinator of personnel management. Following a pattern similar to 
that which led to the constitution of the DG COOM, the RICTC role was 
attributed to a brand new technical actor—the chief information officer 
(CIO)—whose office was located in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
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We suggest that this solution to the initial deadlock was possible because of 
the way the RICTC role was defined, which in turn resonated with the way in 
which the “failing ICT project” issue was initially framed. As Figure 3 shows, 
on one hand, it was because the RICTC was expected to perform government-
wide centralized tasks that it could join an existing movement toward the cen-
tralization of operational management. The need for a coordinating figure was 
a common feature of both financial and informatization logics, and acted as a 
“handle” for the latter to connect to the broader movement.
On the other hand, if the RICTC function had been conceived of as a 
political role, its introduction would have been more sensitive to constitu-
tional logics. Instead, by framing it as an operationalfunction, the RICTC role 
could be attributed to an operative actor (i.e., the CIO), rather than to a politi-
cal one (i.e., a member of the Cabinet). Figure 3 summarizes this argument.
Therefore, at this stage it is worthwhile to investigate in a little more depth 
the partitioning of knowledge that allowed this construction. This is where an 
STS approach can most successfully supplement frame-based theoretical 
models.
Figure 3. RICTC role attribution: Possible alliances and deadlocks.
Note. RICTC = responsible for ICT coordination; ICT = information and communication tech-
nologies; CIO = chief information officer.
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Content-Specific and Systemic Knowledge
Due to the creation of the DG COOM and of the coordinating CIO, from 
2007 to 2010, the Ministry of Internal Affairs centralized tasks that were pre-
viously duplicated in each ministry. We have seen that this was possible by 
invoking the “policy making versus operational management” dichotomy 
inherent in New Public Management (NPM): it was only operational man-
agement tasks that were delegated to the DG COOM and the CIO, thus by-
passing constitutional and bureaupolitical logics that—by definition—apply 
to policy making.
These changes in the inter-departmental order were also facilitated by the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs claiming to act as mediator between Parliament 
and the Cabinet:
I used the arguments and pressure of Parliament in the Cabinet to have things 
done there [i.e., in the Cabinet]. When I said in the Cabinet that I had had a 
general consultation with the Parliament and that they insisted that I gave them 
a list of [ICT] projects, this put me in a position with colleague ministries such 
that they had to support me. (Former Minister of Internal Affairs)
As the STS literature points out, knowledge plays a crucial role in posi-
tioning actors at the intersection of different logics (Law, 1991). On which 
type of knowledge could the Ministry of Internal Affairs rely, to claim a nodal 
position as a mediator between the Parliament and the Cabinet?
During the hearings, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was described as hav-
ing operational management knowledge: “the attention and knowledge for 
operational management that are proper to Internal Affairs are not proper to 
other [departments], which are more focussed on policy” (Former Minister of 
Internal Affairs). By inference, other ministries (e.g., Public Works and 
Water, Defense, and Housing) have specific policy knowledge necessary to 
carry out their functions.
In the commission hearings, a parallelism can be traced between these two 
types of knowledge and the “policy making versus operational management” 
dichotomy. Actors with policy-making tasks are characterized by specific 
expertise in their particular domains of intervention. Conversely, the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs has no specific expertise, but a “systemic” form of knowl-
edge that is necessary to address operational management tasks. This cou-
pling of task attribution and type of knowledge is described by the former 
Minister of Internal Affairs as the “system accountability” construction:
By “system accountability” it is intended that you [i.e., Internal Affairs] are not 
directly responsible for the content, but you are responsible for the system. 
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Some tasks, for instance, are decentralized to municipalities. They are more 
directly responsible for them, but the Minister [of Internal Affairs] keeps a kind 
of system accountability for what happens. I mentioned the advantage of that, 
and I maintain that if you as minister have system accountability for ICT 
projects of the government, it does not mean that you are personally responsible 
for any IT project. I use the example of the [ICT] security system in road 
tunnels. It would be extremely foolish to give a project in that area to the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, which has no expertise in the field of traffic and 
transport; and neither does it have a large staff of officers expert in the field of 
traffic and transport. (Former Minister of Internal Affairs)
This coupling of task attribution and type of knowledge also included a 
pattern of distribution of accountability. It delegates accountability 
over “content” to local authorities and other ministries, and accountability 
over “system” to Internal Affairs. We sum up the “system accountability” 
construction in Table 2.
However, in a deeper analysis, policy-specific expertise and systemic 
knowledge do not constitute a real dichotomy, as they are defined according 
to heterogeneous logical criteria (Rutgers, 2001). On one hand, policy-spe-
cific forms of expertise are defined according to the fields of application and 
required disciplines. This is the classical functional form of organization, in 
which a clear set of competencies is organized according to the “unity of 
command” principle (Raadschelders, 2000). On the other hand, it is not as 
intuitive to define “systemic knowledge.” In the system accountability con-
struction, systemic knowledge is not defined with respect to a specific set of 
competencies, but only in relational terms. First, it is the form of knowledge 
necessary to address operational management tasks. Second, it is the peculiar 
form of knowledge held by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Third, it is a form 
of meta-knowledge useful for supervising the deployment of content-specific 
knowledge.
Systemic knowledge thus resembles what ANT and STS scholars term “tech-
nical knowledge”: an apolitical and instrumental rationality that deliberately 
Table 2. “System Accountability” Construction.
Institutional actors
Other ministries and 
local authorities Internal affairs
Tasks Policy making Operational management
Type of knowledge Policy-domain specific 
expertise
Systemic
Type of accountability Over “content” Over “system”
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avoids addressing any political decisions (Latour, 1996). This is why systemic 
knowledge in the commission hearings came to overlap with ICT-related 
expertise: “you need to just hold together content and system, that is, ICT. You 
should not separate that” (former Minister of Internal Affairs). In other words, 
ICT knowledge is a form of black-boxed knowledge: useful for exerting 
supervision, but never subjected to evaluation, or even description.
Discussion: Shaping the Landscape of Possible 
Alliances and Inevitable Deadlocks
At the outset of this analysis, we saw that the Trouw article framed failures in 
governmental information infrastructures by adopting two unquestioned 
assumptions. First, failures had to be addressed government-wide, rather than 
at the level of individual departments or ministries. Second, failures resulted 
only from technical shortcomings.
The resulting “failing governmental ICT projects” issue was seamlessly 
adopted by Parliament, which—instead of proposing a counter-frame—per-
formed the last function associated with any new frame: it endorsed a remedy 
to the problem (Entman, 2004, p. 5). An RICTC role with government-wide 
scope and overview on all ICT activities was thus identified as the main sta-
bilizing element, and a CIO was appointed at the administrative level of oper-
ational management. This, in turn, affected the inter-departmental organization 
of the Cabinet, with Cabinet-wide operational management of information 
systems becoming the responsibility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
through its coordinating CIO.
Similarly to the cases described by phronetic planning researchers, this 
case shows that—when it comes to government infrastructural failures—the 
media directly influenced not only the political agenda, but indirectly even 
the very organization of the administration. If we compare this case with 
Entman’s scheme in Figure 1, it apparently predicts the opposite result: new 
frames initiated by the media can be strong enough to influence the parlia-
mentary elite. Even more, once Parliament adopted the media-initiated frame 
as dominant, this frame acquired the power to drive changes in the organiza-
tion of inter-departmental relations (i.e., the centralization of operational 
management in the hands of the Ministry of Internal Affairs).
The diffusion of the ICT failure issue to political elites and indirectly to 
administration could rely on some congruencies. The specific way the issue 
was originally framed had a major role in making certain alliances more 
likely, while hampering others.
On one hand, the fact that the “failing ICT project” issue had been defined 
as government-wide facilitated the mutual reinforcement with centralizing 
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logics already prevalent at the level of inter-departmental relations. The need 
to introduce an RICTC role with government-wide scope “resonated” with 
the centralization of operational management driven by financial impera-
tives. On the other hand, the fact that the issue was framed as having techni-
cal causes impeded any political solution, while it facilitated an operational 
solution. The technical character of the issue led actors to also conceive of the 
RICTC as a technical role. This in turn allowed by-passing constitutional and 
bureaupolitical constraints. If it had been conceived of as a political role, the 
introduction of the RICTC would, in fact, have been more sensitive to consti-
tutional and bureaupolitical logics (see Figure 3).13
In other words, the way the issue was initially framed by the media and 
then adopted by Parliament shaped and unintentionally pre-selected the land-
scape of possible alliances and inevitable deadlocks; it steered the direction 
of action toward specific organizational solutions.
If we follow Entman’s notion of “cultural congruence,” we could hypoth-
esize that the frame proposed by Trouw was so congruent with ongoing sche-
mas that it was able to reverse-engineer Entman’s cascade. Therefore, which 
were the schemas that dominated the political culture, to the point that the 
cascade model could be inverted?
It is undeniable that claims of infrastructural failures involving public 
resources found wide resonance in the financial climate of late 2000s/early 
2010s. As a matter of fact, the premise under which the Trouw article framed 
the “failing governmental ICT projects” issue postulated the “precedence of 
economically based values over legally based values” (Moe, 1994, p. 114) 
introduced 20 years ago by the NPM.14 As a consequence, this case reveals a 
pattern of influence on government by narratives of failure that is rather dif-
ferent from that described by the phronetic research approach. While 
phronetic research argued that the media tend to influence planning practices 
toward more traceable political accountability, our case study shows that 
when narratives of failure continue their journey into the governmental-
administrative agenda, they can magnify financial concerns, rather than prin-
ciples of democratic accountability.
However, this explanation risks echoing functionalist reasoning. Moreover, 
it does not add much to a heuristic of change. A complementary explanation 
for the sensitivity of the government to media claims of ICT failures might be 
found in the organizational reputation literature. According to Maor, Gilad, 
and Bloom (2013), government agencies are
more likely to respond to opinions about core functional areas with regards to 
which [they have] a generally weak reputation, or about matters wherein [their] 
reputation is still evolving, and to keep silent over functions regarding which 
[they] generally enjoy a strong reputation. (p. 582)
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These authors argue that the intensity of a response to criticism is inversely 
correlated to the strength of their reputation in a specific area.
Adopting this framework as an explanation would suggest that the Dutch 
Parliament strikingly reacted to media-triggered ICT failure claims because 
informatization is an area in which its reputation is weak. Indeed, in the com-
mission hearings, the weak reputation of government agencies with regard to 
ICT expertise was a recurring theme, as is also widely acknowledged in the 
literature on eGovernment (Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow, & Tinkler, 2006). 
The introduction of an RICTC role endowed with technical knowledge was 
intended precisely to counteract this lack of knowledge.
Therefore, under this lens, the same parliamentary working groups and 
commission on ICT failures might be conceived of as an attempt by the Dutch 
Parliament to improve its reputation as far as information systems and ICT 
expertise were concerned.15 At the same time, we cannot avoid noticing that 
this goal was only partially achieved. During the parliamentary commission’s 
hearings, one constant request was that witnesses refrained from using techni-
cal jargon. As we have discussed above, “ICT knowledge” was “black-boxed” 
as a form of systemic knowledge. While ICT knowledge can act as an umbrella 
term for a wide range of skills (e.g., data center management, programming, 
application development), none of these specializations was mentioned in the 
commission’s working papers, nor were other technical and/or social details 
mentioned that could have helped explain the causes of system failures.
Conclusion
This article has described the media-prompted rise of the notion of “failing 
governmental ICT projects” in the Netherlands since 2007, and has consid-
ered how it linked (or did not link) with other governmental-administrative 
logics. Despite some tentative solutions (e.g., appointing a general CIO), as 
of today, the actor-network built to prevent considerable cost and time over-
runs of ICT projects has not yet stabilized into a permanent governance struc-
ture, as recent press statements by the parliamentary commission’s chairman 
have shown (Stokmans, 2014b; Veldwijk, 2015).
In its final report published in October 2014, the Dutch parliamentary 
commission advocates the creation of an ICT responsible agency to supervise 
the development of information infrastructures across the various ministries. 
If, in abstract terms, the solution remains the same (i.e., a government-wide 
supervisor endowed with systemic knowledge), what changes is the actual, 
concrete actor tasked with fulfilling this role. The commission suggests creat-
ing an “Office for ICT Assessment” (Bureau ICT-toetsing—BIT), a tempo-
rary ICT authority composed of “independently minded and autonomous 
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experts” (Dutch Temporary Commission on Government ICT Projects, 2014, 
p. 2). As a further confirmation of our analysis, in its reaction to the report, 
the Cabinet has proposed the appointment of the new BIT under the control 
of the Cabinet-wide CIO (Veldwijk, 2015).
Differently, following Roe (2013), we suggest that the figure in charge of 
“managing the mess” should possess both systemic knowledge about the 
macro design and expertise of specific projects. As Roe has pointed out, try-
ing to handle wicked problems from a macro perspective that can only rely 
on formal and deductive knowledge might easily worsen problems. Likewise, 
“managing the mess” from a micro perspective endowed only with experien-
tial knowledge of micro operations might lack in reliability. According to 
Roe, actual mess management should be delegated to mid-level profession-
als, who can integrate the macro perspective with contingent scenario formu-
lations, and the micro perspective with pattern recognition drawn from the 
experience of individual projects. Similarly, we suggest that the BIT—or any 
other agency having ICT coordinating functions—should pursue the integra-
tion of both deductive and experiential knowledge, if it aims for success in 
halting or preventing disasters in ICT projects (Hoppe, 2015; Pelizza & 
Hoppe, 2014).
To conclude, the case study comes with a recommendation to those actors 
in charge of translating any media debate into the political and governmental 
agenda. In this case, they are parliamentary working groups and commis-
sions. As we have seen, addressing infrastructural failures can lead to a vari-
ety of organizational outcomes, depending not only on how an issue is 
initially constructed by the media but also on whether this construction is 
adopted with or without problematization by political and administrative 
actors.
We might wonder whether we would have obtained the same organiza-
tional solution (i.e., coordinating CIO under the authority of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs), if scarcity of benefits had been framed by Parliament in a 
different way than that adopted by the Trouw, so that they did not align with 
the financial logic and the ongoing movement of centralization of inter-
departmental relations, but rather with constitutional, bureaupolitical consid-
erations. Parliamentary groups and commissions would have the opportunity 
to steer the number of possible organizational solutions, but only if they prob-
lematized how the issues framed by the media are translated into the political 
and governmental agenda.
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Notes
 1. Although the authors would prefer to use the term information system for the 
purpose of this article, they adopt the term ICT, which is preponderantly used in 
the case study analyzed.
 2. That is, transport infrastructure such as bridges, dams, submarine tunnels costing 
billion euros.
 3. Tension points are a “type of power relation [which] is particularly susceptible to 
problematization and thus to change, because it is fraught with dubious practices, 
contestable knowledge, and potential conflict” (Flyvbjerg, 2012, p. 171).
 4. The “so-called ‘Great Belt fixed link’ (1987-1998) was meant to connect East 
and West Denmark, and link Scandinavia with continental Europe across the 
entrance to the Baltic Sea” (Flyvbjerg, 2012, p. 170).
 5. This second-grade objectivity is one of the key epistemological starting points of 
the Actor-Network Theory (ANT) approach underpinning this research (Latour, 
2005). We thank one anonymous reviewer for suggesting making more explicit 
this key methodological and epistemological assumption.
 6. The seven projects were the modernization of the personal data register (mGBA), 
the electronic patient dossier (EPD), a surveillance system for tunnel infra-
structure, a digital communication system for emergency services (C2000), the 
electronic debit card for public transport (OV), the vehicle register, and finally 
unemployment and social assistance electronic services (Werk.nl).
 7. Not only were the commission hearings streamed live and then made available 
on YouTube, but also the discursive strategy of the commission members was 
explicitly oriented to “having these issues understood by Dutch citizens at home” 
(commission chairman).
 8. Key government and administrative witnesses during the hearings agreed in 
acknowledging a causative role of the article published by Trouw for the subse-
quent organizational developments. Following the constructivist approach men-
tioned above, this shared acknowledgment must be treated as a result in itself, 
and methodological choices must follow accordingly. Therefore, the following 
analysis concentrates on the peculiar framing brought about by this article.
 9. In this respect, it is important to note that in the Dutch Constitution, “government” 
(overheid) is any executive branch at any level: central government, provinces, 
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municipalities, water boards. However, “national government” (Rijksoverheid) 
refers only to the central government in The Hague (Andeweg & Irwin, 2005).
10. It is not one of the goals of this article to reconstruct the contested history of the 
foundational politics versus administration dichotomy. That such a history is usu-
ally traced back to Woodrow Wilson’s 1887 article “The Study of Administration” 
says a lot about the number of sedimentations a comprehensive, serious study 
should include. For a map of the almost endless debate on this issue, see Du Gay 
(2000, pp. 114-135) and Overeem (2009). For the purpose of this study, it is suf-
ficient to mention that in the Dutch administrative system, both personnel man-
agement and information systems come under operational management. There are 
historical reasons for that. As Raadschelders (2000) has recalled, in the early 20th 
century’s welfare state, staff units responsible for internal functions (i.e., personnel, 
financial, organizational, and—more recently—information management) were 
created within each ministry as a consequence of functional reorganization. It was 
the NPM reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s that re-ignited the debate about 
the decoupling of operational management from policy making (Hood, 1995; Moe, 
1994; Pollitt, 1995). During this period, the long-standing dichotomy between pol-
itics and administration was re-enacted as a system in which politicians should 
avoid any involvement with the routine operations of government management, 
while executives and officials should efficiently implement the required policies 
by means of private-sector-like techniques (Du Gay, 2000).
11. As Raadschelders recalled, in the early 20th century operational staff units were 
created within each ministry. As late as 1949, the first U.S. Hoover commission 
still recommended that personnel, accounting, financial, and budgeting functions 
be decentralized to single agencies (Moe, 1994).
12. For instance, the Directorate General (DG) Function, Control, Audit, and 
Certification; the unit Financial, Economic Affairs, and Control; the direc-
tion Financial Operational Management; the Strategy, Innovation and Account 
management unit; the direction Personnel, Organization, and Information 
of the DG Management Public Sector (Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en 
Koninkrijksrelaties, 2006).
13. We have in this case what Roe (1994) would call a “metanarrative”: an impasse 
between conflicting narratives (i.e., the constitutional/bureaupolitical logic ver-
sus Parliament’s need for a Cabinet-wide supervisor) in which actors develop 
new narratives (i.e., the supervisor as a technical role attributable to an actor that 
has operational management tasks). The new narrative in turn recast the issue in 
such a way that a solution could be devised.
14. This case also highlights another analogy between media influence and NPM 
reforms from the 1990s. As Raadschelders and Bemelmans-Videc (2007) have 
pointed out, NPM reforms have mainly concerned the operational level; they 
tend to avoid directly affecting constitutional foundations, and rather to influ-
ence them by pulling operational (i.e., economic) levers. In a similar way, in the 
case described in this article, the introduction of the responsible for ICT coor-
dination (RICTC) role by-passed constitutional constraints and interacted with 
developments at the operational management level.
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15. Actually, the attempt was conducted at three levels: institutional (by Parliament), 
party-political (by the then leading party in the Dutch government coali-
tion, which established the commission), and individual (by the commission 
chairman).
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